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The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has established 
aviation accident and incident investigation obligations within Article 26 of its 
Convention on International Civil Aviation.  This is further developed in ICAO 
Annex 13 - Aircraft Incident and Incident Investigation and Annex 19 – Safety 
Management.  The ICAO member States have implemented these international 
aviation investigation standards in various regulations, policies and procedures 
that have traditionally focused on the most severe events.  Further implementation 
of aviation safety investigations into less severe events has significant 
opportunities to enhance aviation safety and operational efficiency. 
 
Definitions 
 
• Incident.  An event, other than an accident, associated with the operation 
of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation. 
• Investigation.  A process conducted for the purpose of accident or incident 
prevention which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the 
drawing of conclusions, the determination of causes and/or contributing 
factors and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations.  
• Occurrence. An adverse event or condition, other than an accident or 
incident, associated with an aircraft which affects or could affect 
operational safety. 
• Safety Recommendation.  A proposal of a safety investigation based on 
information derived from an investigation, made with the intention of 
preventing accidents and incidents and which in no case creates a 
presumption of blame or liability for an accident or incident. In addition to 
safety recommendations arising from an investigation, safety 
recommendations may result from diverse sources, including safety 
studies.  These recommendations may further be used to identify system 
vulnerability, develop strategies for change, and prioritize the investment 
of safety resources (ICAO, 2013b). 
 
Service Provider Organizations 
 
In general, revenue producing aviation organizations, service providers, 
have an obligation to establish a safety program that includes a proactive element 
to identify and resolve deficiencies.  The State Safety Program (SSP) and Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) should establish regulations for a Safety Management 
System (SMS) in approved training organizations, commercial air transport, 
maintenance organizations, air traffic services and aerodromes (ICAO, 2013b). 
This should also extend to international general aviation operators of large or 
turbojet aircraft.  Included in this obligation is a foundation to monitor and 
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respond to adverse events such as accidents and incidents utilizing traditional 
safety investigation procedures.  These safety investigations may be covered by 
separate regulatory material from the transportation safety investigation authority.   
 
It is important to note that many States provide separate safety and 
enforcement investigations with separate utilization of the outcomes from such 
programs.  The policies and procedures of safety investigations should include 
protections or prohibitions from the use of such material for enforcement actions 
under ICAO Annex 19 Attachment B. The policies of the regulator can be used 
for administrative or enforcement actions. 
 
When incidents do not meet the reporting obligations under safety or 
enforcement policies, the service provider should conduct an internal 
investigation to identify safety deficiencies and implement safety mitigation in 
order to ensure continued safety improvements and thus support safer and more 
efficient operations. Guidance on the implementation of SMS and safety 
investigations is also provided in FAA Advisory Circulars 120-92A for air 
carriers.  Such investigations may vary in complexity but the documentation of 
these safety reviews is essential to build the foundation for future trend analysis 
and to meet the organization’s quality assurance and SMS obligations.  These 
investigative techniques also reinforce the organization’s safety reporting culture 
and provide training experience for the safety investigators.   
 
The reinforcement of the safety culture also helps institutionalize the 
limits of acceptable and unacceptable behavior (CASA, 2009a).  The 
Counselling/discipline decision chart in Appendix B of the CASA SMS Toolkit 
Booklet 2 provides a systematic matrix of how incidents and occurrences might 
be resolved within the organization and assist in the identification of why such 
adverse events happened and might be resolved.  Workers and management thus 
seek to identify unsafe or inefficient activities and resolve these deficiencies. The 
safety risks are solicited through an active safety reporting system and 
documented in a Safety Risk Registry.  Management encourages such reporting 
and understands that it is better to identify an unsafe condition than ignore it. 
Everyone understands the necessity to comply with established safety obligations, 
continually update those safety obligations and ensure that employees respect 
such obligations.  Those who decide not to comply with safety obligations and 
commit a willful violation should expect to receive both disrespect from their 
fellow workers and administrative actions from management. 
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Aviation Organization Policy Statement 
 
The organization should provide a safety policy that ensures the following:  
• Conduct objective and independent investigations of incidents by 
documenting the facts, conditions, and circumstances of such occurrences 
without implying blame or liability; 
• Identify safety deficiencies during investigations with the view toward 
prevention of future occurrences; 
• As appropriate, disseminate the findings of the investigation and 
implement actions to eliminate or reduce risks posed by identified safety 
deficiencies. 
 
Aviation service providers are part of an extraordinarily safe industry.  As 
such, the flying public and regulators have placed greater safety obligations upon 
their operations.  As discussed by Gessell and Dempsey (2011) non-aviation 
activities generally operate under a condition known as Ordinary Care which has 
been defined in the court cases Brown v Kendal and Osborne v Montgomery as 
“that kind and degree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use, such as 
is required by the exigency of the case, and such as is necessary to guard against 
probable dander.”  However, aviation service providers generally must provide 
and Extraordinary Duty of Care that holds them to a highest duty to their 
passengers, higher than that of reasonable care, by the court cases of O’Leary v 
American Airlines and Krasnow v National Airlines.  
General aviation also has greater than ordinary care requirements.  These 
are often enforced using such regulations as the Federal Aviation Regulation 
FAR§91.13 - Careless or reckless operation: No person may operate an aircraft in 
a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.  
 
Legislative Requirements 
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) 
ICAO member States are obliged to conduct aircraft accident and serious 
incident investigation to comply with Article 26 of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation.  This obligation is enacted by State laws and 
regulations.  Such legislation must establish an accident investigation authority 
and the processes identified in ICAO Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident 
Investigation.  Furthermore, the newly published Annex 19 extends these SARPs 
to include the obligation for aviation service providers such as aviation training 
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organizations and airlines to implement investigations into less severe 
deficiencies identified through their SMS and safety data collection applications. 
Early aviation accident investigation evolved from maritime accident 
investigation.  Under the Rules of the Sea, the ship’s captain was ultimately 
responsible for the safety of the ship.  Similarly, aviation accident investigation 
placed the responsibility of the aircraft in the captain’s hands unless some 
extensive mechanical failure could be identified whereby the manufacturer shared 
the responsibility.  Through the advances in manufacturing and regulatory 
oversight, this scheme of human error has remained the major causation of 
aviation accidents and incidents.  Many investigative advances have been 
promoted with greater emphasis on non-reportable incidents and occurrences in 
order to mitigate safety risk to an acceptable level and to share the obligation of 
continual safety improvement throughout the aviation industry. 
The development of the concept of accident causation has also aided in the 
understanding of human and organizational errors and the methodology for 
overcoming these deficiencies.  Such deficiencies can range from active failures, 
either through actions or inactions, to unidentified or latent conditions that are 
often dormant until some triggering event is introduced, such as an autopilot 
failure to maintain a safe flight envelope when icing is encountered (Reason, 
1990).  Under the concept of capturing the low hanging fruit, many incident or 
occurrence investigations might settle for introducing additional training or 
internal policies to overcome a systemic deficiency.  However, if these were more 
fully investigated using the methodology of an accident investigation, the 
recommendations might be more beneficial by changing technology or operating 
limitations of the aircraft.  Again as example, an autopilot that might not be able 
to function in icing conditions might have a procedure to disconnect the autopilot 
and manually fly the aircraft, or limit the duration in which the aircraft could 
operate in icing conditions.  In reality, either the technology of the aircraft to 
operate in icing conditions or the autopilot functions should be modified to 
mitigate the risk of adverse flight performance in icing conditions.  Thus the 
obligation for the pilot to exercise exceptional flying skills would not be a 
necessary recommendation.  This also reduces the need for the organization to 
develop special techniques to overcome deficiencies and thus accept such higher 
risks - a process known as normalization of deviance. This might be successful for 
a period of time when highly experienced pilots use their superior skills to 
overcome such marginal operations; however, over time, new personnel will 
attempt to emulate these normalized deviances with potentially adverse outcomes. 
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Investigation Objective and Independence 
 
ICAO Annex 13 establishes that accident and incident investigations must 
be objective, independent of outside influence and must also be so accepted by the 
service provider organization. ICAO Annex 13, Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1 – states 
that the sole objective of an incident investigation shall be the prevention of 
similar incidents.  It is not the purpose of apportioning blame or liability. Chapter 
5, paragraph 5.4 – further states that incident investigation authority shall have 
independence in the conduct of the investigation and have unrestricted authority 
over it; and, shall be separate from enforcement or administrative actions to 
apportion blame or liability.  Insulation from administrative action should also be 
afforded to service provider internal safety investigations when such studies are 
below the reporting obligations of the State (AAIB, 2013). The US National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Part 830 also ensures that their Accident 
Investigation Reports can only be used for safety; however, factual information 
such as air traffic radar recordings may also be shared with the regulator, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for both safety and enforcement actions.  
The report and investigation obligations for air carriers, the FAA and NTSB are 
further discussed in FAA Advisory Circular AC 120-30A. 
 
Investigation Policy and Procedures 
 
The service provider’s policy should include the obligation to support an 
investigation by the regulator of all reportable accidents and incidents and to 
internally investigate the circumstances of other incidents not meeting that 
severity.  If during an internal safety investigation or study of safety deficiencies 
the service provider identifies conditions that may impact external organizations, 
it should take immediate actions to disseminate such safety information. 
 
For every accident or serious incident, there are perhaps hundreds of 
minor occurrences that have the potential to become accidents. The evaluation of 
hazard reports must ensure that the investigation is compliant with the safety 
policy of the organization to achieve an acceptable level of safety.  Such hazards 
are captured in the Risk Registry for prioritization.  An example of this process is 
discussed in the CASA SMS Toolkit Booklet 3. Since resources to conduct such 
investigations are often limited, there should be a proportional expenditure of 
resources with the estimated level of safety risk. Regardless of the potential for 
mitigation of a safety deficiency, a minimum of data should be collected in order 
to establish a foundation for future trend analysis.   
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The service provider’s investigators should have unhampered access to 
incident information or aircraft components.  The investigators should also solicit 
support from equipment manufacturers, government agencies and experts as 
needed.  The development of positive relations during normal operations will 
facilitate such support during adverse events. This will include permission to 
photograph and document components and take statements to preclude loss of 
vital information.  Such data collection must also respect the privacy of individual 
medical records or other protected or limited access material. 
 
Statements from witnesses and those involved in an incident should be 
insulated from enforcement through voluntary reporting systems such as the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety 
Reporting Program which provides a waiver of enforcement by FAR §91.25 
except where the information relates to an aircraft accident or intentional 
violation.  Similar insulation is provided in the Australian ATSB Act 2003 and 
European Union Article 19 of the Investigation Regulation No 996/2010 Directive 
94/56/EC. An international collaboration on SMS has been established by the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the FAA Office of Aviation Safety 
(AVS), ICAO, and Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA). In 2009 these 
organizations established the Safety Management International Collaboration 
Group (SM ICG) to support the implementation and harmonization of SMS. 
 
Investigation Coordination 
 
Aviation service providers should actively conduct studies or safety 
surveys in order to provide adequate training, to identify deficiencies and to build 
confidence in the safety review process. These reviews also build a foundation for 
development of plans of action for more severe incident or accident.  The SMS 
committee and safety action group may also require supplemental support from 
government and industry organizations. Thus consideration must be provided for 
protection of individuals reporting deficiencies and limitations to incident 
information source disclosure (ICAO, 2013a).  
 
The organization’s safety investigators should be issued policy guidance 
as to their authority and responsibility.  The investigators should also be furnished 
with guidance material that can be provided to witnesses and participants in the 
investigation in order to protect the disclosure of the material gathered.  Similarly, 
the use of outside experts can be established through letters of understanding or 
contracts which should caution them of their obligation to protect investigation 
material from disclosure.    
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Investigator Training 
 
The service provider should have appropriate investigator training. Such 
training should include an initial overview in investigation management and 
witness interviewing, followed by on-the-job training under an experienced 
investigator (ICAO, 2003).  This can then be augmented by a formal incident 
investigation course and more advanced training in specialties such as flight data 
analysis and human factors (CASA, 2009b). 
Investigator Equipment 
 
  In addition to individual training, investigators must be provided with 
certain equipment and have policies and agreements in place for access to this 
equipment such as flight data analysis and flight reconstruction applications. They 
should also receive training and equipment for incident site work in support of 
more severe incidents or accidents away from the service provider’s normal 
location of operations.  The ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident 
Investigation, Part I (Doc 9756), has information related to an investigation field 
kit and protective equipment for potential hazards at an incident site. 
 
  It is essential to consider all aspects of a prior incident before attempting to 
re-enact an incident for study.  Unfortunately many accidents or incidents have 
been repeated during the investigation of prior events. 
 
Incident Prevention Measures  
 ICAO Annex 13, Chapter 8, requires States to establish a mandatory 
incident reporting system to collect actual or potential safety deficiency 
information.  States shall also establish voluntary incident reporting that is non-
punitive and has protection for the sources of the information under Chapter 5 of 
Annex 19.  Annex 19 further reinforces the obligation of incident investigation in 
the State Safety Program Element 1.3 - Accident and incident investigation: 
The State has established an independent accident and incident 
investigation process, the sole objective of which is the prevention of 
accidents and incidents, and not the apportioning of blame or liability. 
Such investigations are in support of the management of safety in the 
State. In the operation of the SSP, the State maintains the independence of 
the accident and incident investigation organization from other State 
aviation organizations. 
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 This is also implemented by the service provider in the SMS Components 
related to Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance and Safety Promotion. 
 
State Safety Risk Management - Service provider’s safety requirements for SMS   
 
“The State has established the controls which govern how service 
providers will identify hazards and manage safety risks.” 
 
State Safety Assurance - Safety data collection, analysis and exchange   
 
“The State has established mechanisms to ensure the capture and storage 
of data on hazards and safety risks at both an individual and aggregate 
State level. The State has also established mechanisms to develop 
information from the stored data, and to actively exchange safety 
information with service providers and/or other States as appropriate.” 
 
State Safety Promotion - External training, communication and dissemination of 
safety information   
 
The State provides education and promotes awareness of safety risks and 
two-way communication of safety-relevant information to support, among 
service providers, the development of an organizational culture that fosters 
an effective and efficient SMS. 
 A sample case study of the implementation of a safety investigation or 
review is provided in the appendix.  The ICAO Safety Management Manual 
Document 9859 provides additional emphasis into a service provider’s safety 
practices through the Eight Building Blocks identified in Section 3.7.1 (ICAO, 
2013a). These are further reinforced in Appendix 1 of ICAO Annex 19.  A service 
provider must be able to identify a deficiency before it can be managed.  The 
periodic measurement of safety indicators will allow the development of trends 
and assist management in the allocation of resources. Safety performance 
measurements can be used to document both safety performance and efficiency 
performance through the need for fewer spare equipment or personnel due to 
fewer damaged equipment or personnel injuries (UK, 2006, September).  Such 
continuous monitoring of normal operations for the identification of abnormalities 
or exceedences is an important step.  Dissemination of lessons learned and best 
practices through the exchange of safety information enhances safety awareness, 
builds an open or positive safety culture and further supports the identification of 
safety issues.  This is also referred to as a Just Safety Culture because 
management and employees have a clear understanding of acceptable and 
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unacceptable behaviour and how unacceptable behaviour might result in sanctions 
under ICAO Annex 19, Appendix 2. 
 
The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Agency (CASA) has provided 
guidance for the development of its SMS and the investigation of safety 
deficiencies by service providers in its CASA SMS Toolkit Booklet 4 Safety 
Assurance.  This includes incident and occurrence investigation, documentation 
and dissemination. 
 
CASA Regulation (CASR) Part 142.200 establishes the responsibilities of 
a service provider’s safety manager and includes the obligation to 
implement a SMS including corrective, remedial and preventative action; 
regular discussion with the chief executive officer the effectiveness of the 
SMS; and establish a continuous improvement system. 
 
CSAR Part 142.265 establishes that the SMS must be a systemic approach 
to managing safety by the identification of deficiencies related to training, 
operations and human factors.  This approach will include the 
organizational structure, accountability, policies and procedures necessary 
to manage safety in a systemic way during normal and emergency 
operations.  The SMS will monitor and measure safety performance and 
conduct internal safety investigations in order to ensure the sustainability 
of the organization through the management of change and provide for 
continuous improvement.   
  
Investigation Organization and Management 
  
 A safety review or investigation should be organized and managed so 
that the investigators can efficiently perform their various tasks.  It is essential 
that an investigation proceeds systematically through all aspects of the incident 
even when causes are apparent. This may include the use of specialized outside 
experts. 
 
  A more complicated incident investigation management system may have 
several functional areas with several investigation teams.  Depending on the 
magnitude and circumstances of the incident, there may be from two to ten 
technical investigation areas that might include: Witnesses, Weather, Air Traffic 
Services, Aircraft Structures, Aircraft Systems, Powerplants, Maintenance 
Records, Survival Factors, Human Performance, Aircraft Performance, and Flight 
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Recorders.  Smaller incidents may be performed by a single investigator who may 
be supplemented by specialists. 
 
  It is essential that all personnel with access to the information developed by 
the safety investigation understand and comply with the process for distribution of 
the finding in order to minimize speculation or inaccurate information. A central 
point of approval of all reports and announcement must be established and all 
inquiries sent to that person.  Any premature dissemination of factual information, 
speculation or rumors can prejudice the investigation and dilute the organization’s 
confidence in the investigation outcomes. 
 
Laboratory Testing of Aircraft Systems and Components 
 
In some cases, examination or testing of specific components will be 
required.  The outside testing laboratory should follow the same policies and 
procedures for tests and component examinations as used for the service 
provider’s investigation.  Often the component manufacturer’s facilities have 
specialized equipment to assist in such analysis; however, close supervision by 
the service provider’s investigators should be used to ensure there is no real or 
perceived conflict of interest. Each component will be tagged with its name, part 
number, serial number and the incident identifier.  The component should be 
protected for shipment and include the conditions under which the component 
was operated and any suspected or specific faults to be tested so as to help focus 
the efforts of the testing.  At a minimum a telephone communication should be 
made with the testing agency to establish a test plan and requested evaluations. 
Simply sending a component for testing with a note that it failed is insufficient 
guidance. After the testing is completed, the results will be reviewed and 
incorporated into the investigation report. 
 
Documentation of Incidents and Occurrences 
 
 All incident and occurrence reports should contain as much information as 
necessary to capture all relative information for inclusion in trend analysis 
programs for continuous improvement and monitoring. The report may include 
both immediate and systemic findings.  The identification of findings does not 
imply fault or blame and shall not be used for administrative or civil action.  
Where outside organizations are included in the findings, there should be 
coordinated with such organizations prior to distribution of the report. The safety 
team should also be mindful of the access of the report by regulators and other 
parties, and where possible de-identify those involved.  This may assist in the 
promotion and solicitation of future critical safety information. 
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            The safety team, and those organizations involved in the investigation, 
might identify safety deficiencies prior to the delivery of the final report.  Where 
appropriate, action to correct these identified deficiencies should be initiated as 
soon as possible.  It is also essential that a tracking system be implemented to 
monitor the mitigation and ensure the corrective actions remain sufficient. 
 
Findings and Recommendations for Mitigation of Deficiencies 
 
The format of the safety investigation report will follow local guidance.  
The circumstances of the incident or occurrence will determine the size and scope 
of the report.  Documents that are required to support the facts, analysis, 
conclusions, and recommendations are often included in appendices to the report. 
In consultation with the safety team members, the organization’s accountable 
executive is responsible for evaluation of the evidence gathered and the drafting 
of the report.  While the investigation should strive to achieve concurrence with 
all of the factual information, there may be alternative views in the report in order 
to fully cover all contingencies. The accountable executive may also be assisted 
by a separate safety expert in review of the safety investigation to ensure the 
recommendations are sufficient to mitigate the risk of future incidents or 
occurrences to an acceptable level. 
 
            The report may contain administrative actions, such as changes to standard 
operating procedures.  There may also be lessons learned to be included in 
indoctrination and training evolutions to improve aviation safety culture of the 
organization. A standardized method must be established to incorporate the safety 
recommendations and corrective actions throughout the organization and to 
ensure that those not present and new staff are made aware of these new 
procedures. These processes are part of a change management program within the 
organization (UK, 2013).  Should the mitigation procedures prove inadequate, the 
safety team should revisit the report and determine what additional steps must be 
taken. Supporting outside organizations should also be informed of these new 
conditions for their consideration.   
 
Summary 
 
Traditional aviation accident and incident investigation methodology 
provides an exceptional foundation for SMS investigations through a holistic 
approach to identify safety deficiencies.  This leads to a more robust safety risk 
assessment for the mitigation of such deficiencies.  The just-culture evaluation of 
incident and occurrence investigation further demonstrates to the organization the 
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value of continual safety improvement to better support the efficiency and 
sustainability and of the organization.  
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Appendix 
 
Case Study on employee nourishment: 
Hazard Identification – Through voluntary reports and observations from 
safety team members, it has been identified that some pilots and maintenance staff 
are exhibiting decreased performance near the end of their work schedule.  In 
discussion with these groups, it was identified that the organization has not 
included the importance of adequate nourishment during induction and periodic 
human factors training as required by regulatory guidance. 
 
Safety Policy: 
The organization’s SMS should provide a process for a proactive and 
integrated approach to Safety.  This should include the active support of both 
employees and management. The Safety Policy should describe the structure and 
scope of the organization, resources, staff responsibilities and how safety 
decisions are managed throughout the organization.  The current policy does not 
address nourishment. 
 
Safety Risk Management: 
 Existing Mitigation – the organization has several vending machines that 
have candy and soft drinks along with a poster discussion proper hydration during 
the summer. 
 Current Level of Risk – because the organization is not near a restaurant, 
staff often bring food from home or rely on the snacks available.  Also, because 
time for meals is not built into the work schedule, employees often simply eat at 
their desk or while walking to or from meetings.  The severity of such lack of 
proper nourishment is moderate and the likelihood of the lack of nourishment is 
also moderate.  
 Risk Tolerability – the safety team has determined that the lack of proper 
nourishment and time to consume such nourishment has decreased the efficiency 
and safety of the organization to an Unacceptable Level requiring attention. 
 Further mitigation – the safety team has determined that an additional 
nourishment and training policy must be implemented.  The vending company has 
been contacted to provide more nourishing options and a mobile catering 
company has been contacted to provide a hot meal during each shift.  
Furthermore, the staff is encouraged to not eat meals at their desk and the lunch 
room has been expanded to provide free water, microwaves, and refrigerators. 
 Revised Level of Risk – following a test period, the safety team determined 
that the new policy, training and resources provided have achieved an acceptable 
level of safety.  It was further noted that employee happiness and efficiency had 
increased. 
15
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Safety Assurance: 
 The safety team monitors the induction and periodic training programs to 
ensure the continued emphasis on nourishment and hydration. The safety team 
also monitors regulatory guidance material for new programs or initiatives 
regarding nourishment. 
 
Safety Training and Promotion: 
 The initial induction program now includes nourishment and hydration, 
with periodic promotion during changes in seasons and duty locations.  The safety 
team also conducts an annual competition for employees and their families 
regarding nourishment, soliciting menus and posters to be used throughout the 
year to remind employees of the importance of proper nourishment and hydration. 
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